The big story of the week was from Bloomberg’s Robertson & Riley: Mysterious ’08 Turkey Pipeline Blast Opened New Cyberwar Era. While the headline isn’t correct, the sourcing is anonymous and some of the technical conclusions are wrong, this is a great example of what cyber weapons may be used for in the future. There may be, and I’d argue will be, many uses of ICS cyber weapons that will not be “war”. I’m looking forward to these discussions at ICSage.
The US House and Senate passed some cybersecurity legislation this week. It will have little impact on critical infrastructure / ICS security, but now the Representatives and Senators can say they did something. It is truly sad if Rep. Meehan is correct in saying, “S. 2519 is the first significant cyber legislation in a decade and among the most important legislation that has been passed this Congress.” You can judge for yourself. Here is the House write-up of the benefits of S.2519 National Cybersecurity Protection Act.
Bedrock Automation has been in semi-stealth mode, if there is such a thing. They have been positioning a “clean sheet of paper” approach to ICS and ICS security. Building a new system from scratch. Details have been and are still very limited, but they released a white paper this week.
Adam Segal from the Council on Foreign Relations published The Top Ten Cybersecurity Incidents in China of 2014.
Not sure exactly when this was published in 2014, but also worth reading is Chris Valasek and Charlie Miller’s A Survey of Remote Automotive Attack Surfaces.
The US Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) will provide research funding for two somewhat ICS security related topics: Privacy Protecting Analytics for the Internet of Things and Enhanced Distributed Denial of Service Defense.
The South Beach Pool Party will be at the Surfcomber Hotel on Thursday after the S4 Technical Sessions. We are pleased to announce the entertainment for the party … The Aqualillies!
This synchronized swimming group will perform a few numbers in the great Surfcomber pool and then mingle and take pictures. They have performed at TED, Disney World, award shows and other great events.
The pool at the Surfcomber is the perfect venue for the party and this entertainment with balconies, the pool deck, and of course the ocean view at sunset.
I like the Aqualillies mission statement:
Our goal is to inspire people with beauty, grace, and spectacle, bringing to life the magic of the universe through synchronized swimming and dance. By following our dreams we hope to encourage others do the same: to free their imagination, seek out adventure, believe in themselves and their power to make the world a better place. We are reinventing water ballet for the new millennium!
We have some other fun surprises for this very unusual ICSsec event.
After the party you will be right in the heart of South Beach so you can grab dinner, more drinks, go to a club or just people watch. We will have a bus going back to the Trump at 11PM for those wanting to stay down in South Beach post party.
The registration count is at 126. This means there are 24 seats left at the tier 3 price and only 64 seats left in total. You need to book now if you want to get your spot at S4x15 Week.
The room block at the Trump International is SOLD OUT. There are still rooms left at the conference rate at the Surfcomber Hotel in South Beach (where the party on Thursday will be held). This room block is available until December 20th so book your room now.
S4x15 attendees have some choices for the Friday activity. There is the ICSage: ICS Cyber Weapons conference and now two one-day advanced training classes. We pick classes that will teach students with the right experience a new, leading edge skill in one day. These classes are typically being taught for the first time. The two classes this year are:
Instructors: Corey Thuen and Reid Wightman of Digital Bond
Corey has been digging into CANBus as part of his research project he will present in the S4 Technical Sessions. He learned a lot and wants to pass that along to the students.
There is no way to do this course without the right hardware. So there is a $100 hardware supplement so every student will have a BeagleBone with CANBus Cape they can use in the course and take home with them.
Why Should the Red Team Have All the Fun?
Instructors: Jim Gilsinn and Bryan Singer of Kenexis
Jim and the Kenexis team have developed a new ICS lab environment that they can bring on the road. So there will be some instruction focusing on defensive techniques and then the class will have a Red/Blue competition.
Each lab pod will have three students on each team and some of the lessons learned will be on the techniques and reasons why the various teams won and lost.
The 100+ that have already registered for S4x15 should have received an email on how they can switch from ICSage to the class or add the class if they want.
Seats for each class are limited and look closely at the required knowledge. You will be left behind if you don’t have the required knowledge.
This year we have a fun addition to the S4 Cocktail Party held on the Kovens Center deck overlooking the Intracoastal Waterway … drones. We are bringing in CineDrones to let attendees fly a drone through an obstacle course. They claim the drones are virtually indestructible, and I’m sure some first time pilots will put this to the test. We will have prizes for the best times on the course.
CineDrones will also pilot a drone overhead with a camera and display the events on screens inside and outside. Kovens does a great job with the food at this event, and it’s always fun to relax on the deck at sunset after a long day of hardcore ICSsec technical talks. The Welcome Party on Tuesday is sponsored by PFP Cybersecurity and Waterfall. It is a Cuban themed party down on the beach at the Trump International. We have cigar rollers, domino tables, Cuban food and drink and music, and some other fun surprises. This was a big hit even in unseasonably cold weather last year, so we decided to run it back for another year. The South Beach Pool Party is the big finish of the S4x15 social events on Thursday. We have some fun surprises for this that we will disclose next week. Stay tuned.
We have added Kim Zetter, author of Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon, to the S4x15 Week Agenda. We will have Kim onstage for a live interview as part of ICSage on Friday. I’ll have a few questions, but we will open much of the interview for audience questions and comments.
Kim will be doing a book signing at lunch on Friday and all attendees will be given a copy of her book.
Some of the other sessions added to the agenda in recent weeks include:
- Kyle Wilhoit on The State of SCADA Malware. Kyle was involved in identifying and investigating the recent malware that has been searching for ICS applications. You also need to hear about his incubation concept and environment.
- Dr. Chee-Wooi Ten will give a brief introduction into research on Simulating Multiple Substation Failures.
- Mark Heard and Jonathan Pollet have been added to OTDay to show how to Use the NIST Cybersecurity Framework in Your ICS Program.
We are now in the third tier of pricing, seats 101-150, and you will want to reserve your hotel room while the conference rate is available.
Sean McBride’s Finding SCADA Honeypots on Shodan article is a twist on the Internet connected ICS story. He finds 58 Conpots and 67 honeypots listed as Water Control Valve #27. Two points in this article. One, some basic analysis is required to weed out honeypots. And two, you need to add more reality and interaction to your SCADA Honeypot if you want it to be believable.
Wonderware released a new version of their SmartGlance mobile app. We regularly beat up these ICS mobile apps for promoting remote control from any untrusted phone anywhere in the world. It was refreshing to read the Wonderware press release that focused on making plant information available anywhere, not control.
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is petitioning the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a rule change “to ensure the regulation is not overly burdensome for NRC licensees, and adequately protects the public health and safety and common defense and security”. It reduce the types and number of devices, applications and subsystems that are subject to cybersecurity regulation. Joe Weiss stirred things up with his “The Arrogance of the US Nuclear Power Industry” article.
Admiral Rogers, Director of the NSA, testified in Congress yesterday. He stated that China and one or two other countries have the capability to attack ICS and affect the US electric grid and other critical infrastructure. This quote was thought provoking, “We need to define what would be offensive, what would be an act of war,” he said. “Being totally on the defensive is a very losing strategy to me.” I need to hear that in context.
The second price tier of S4x15 tickets (51-100) will sell out before Thanksgiving. Get yours now, save $100 and reserve your spot.
Image by Carbon Arc
Stephen Hilt and a team of volunteers are working furiously on the ICS Village for S4x15. The ICS Village at S4x14 had a large amount of ICS devices, 6 different vendor PLC’s, HMI, industrial switches, historians, …, and we allowed attendees to play and attack them at will. Of course, every year near needs to get better.
One thing we learned from our past ICS Villages and the recent Defcon ICS Village is that a lot of people are at a loss of what to do in the Village. So the ICS Village at S4x15 will have a capture the flag (CTF) competition with a ICS flags in five different categories.
The CTF will be scored and prizes will be awarded to the top individuals or teams.
We will be releasing information on the ICS Village every two weeks that will help attendees gather their tools and plan their attacks. To begin, the diagram below shows a simplified network diagram of the ICS Village. Some specific product names will be added in future updates.
The flags and scoring will be on a Jeopardy style board with the following categories. Each category will have different levels of difficulty with corresponding point values.
- Reconnaissance. Example easy flag: identify a historian on the network. Example medium flag: pull tag names from a PLC.
- Exploitation. Example medium flag: use Modicon password recovery to recover a super secret password. Example hard flag: downgrade software on a PLC.
- Process. Example medium flag: modify an HMI display.
- Forensics. Example easy flag: review firewall logs for signs of ICS specific malware. Example hard flag: Identify hacker identity via evidence left in firmware.
- Protection. Example easy flag: write ICS signature for an earlier discovered flag.
If you would like to participate in the preparation or running of the ICS Village, or just have an idea for a flag, contact Stephen Hilt.
The CLUSIF (Club de la sécurité de l’information français) has issued “an overview of existing documents, standards, guidelines and best practices” (link is for the document in English). The 24-page document gives an overview of the most popular and useful documents, and some advice on determining which documents might be most helpful to the reader based on a variety of criteria.
Robert Lee and Thomas Rid’s paper OMG CYBER! Thirteen Reasons Why Hype Makes for Bad Policy is available for free download. I’d like to see a follow up paper OMG CYBER! Thirteen Thing Your Vendor and Government Are Not Telling You About Cyber Risk in Your ICS.
Waterfall Security, best known for their Unidirectional Security Gateways, has announced Application Data Control. While technical details are still limited, it appears to add deep packet inspection to their product line.
Perry Pederson of Langner Communications has written a 28-page RIPE Crosswalk document that compares and maps RIPE to NERC CIP, NEI, WIB, NIST CSF, …
We are well into the second tier pricing of S4x15 Week tickets (51-100). The price goes up $100 each tier so register early to save money. We were happy to add to Tim Yardley as a speaker this week as well as some additional OTDay sessions.
We added a bunch of info to the S4x15 site including the newly designed banner, see below. We are almost through the first 50 tier ticket pricing (42 sold).
“DHS ICS-CERT” and FBI announced, a bit clumsily, that they will be touring 13 cities across the US and providing ”a series of SECRET briefings …for cleared asset owners/operators. … These briefings will provide additional context and information about the BlackEnergy campaign as well as the Havex malware that both targeted industrial control systems.” Sounds like a worthwhile program if they have unique information. I always wonder why these briefings happen after, rather than before, the information is released publicly by researchers and vendors. This is related to an ICS-CERT Alert issued this week.
Some good news on the INL front, they recently added Andy Bochman to the team. I’ve always admired Andy’s writing on Smart Grid security and other ICSsec matters when at IBM and in his own startup. Good luck Andy.
Fireeye released a whitepaper on a Russian organization they are calling APT28. It does not appear to have any critical infrastructure ICS aspects, although some of the government systems being attacked or having intelligence gathered could be ICS.
The team at Netrecsec wrote a nice blog summarizing the three vendors who were distributing Havex infected software.
This post was inspired by two tweets from Reid.
First, DHS needs to stop putting everything they do under the ICS-CERT umbrella. There is a CERT function, and there is a bunch of other non-CERT activity. The naming confuses everyone, and you would almost think that is intentional.
Next, as Reid suggested they should be very clear about their vulnerability handling processes. Right now it is coordination of what researchers submit and the vendor response. There is no analysis, no evaluation of impact, no validation of the vulnerabilities, and no validation of the fix. If the vendor says it is fixed, the alert or advisory says it is fixed. The vendor is not even asked how they fixed the vuln. The process, the best that we can tell, is simply coordination of messaging from other peoples info. Figure out what boilerplate fits best, pull some info from the vendor announcements, and put out an Alert or Advisory.
You probably surmise from my tone that I think this is inadequate and actually of little use. It is particularly harmful when they measure success based on the number of alerts and advisories issued. My recommendation would be to shut ICS-CERT down and just roll it into US-CERT. The whole purpose of ICS-CERT at its creation was to provide second level support for US-CERT when ICS vulns were found. We did not need to replicate the existing coordination function.
However, I realize some see value from the Alerts and Advisories, so I would count it a success if ICS-CERT was simply forthright about how they handle ICS vulnerabilities and generate Alerts and Advisories. Reid is right that the public has assumptions about what they are doing that are totally wrong.
I’ve been sitting back and watching to see what activity Reid’s S4xJapan talk would generate. When he found the vulnerabilities in Version 2 of CoDeSys it generated some Advisories that eventually stated the problem was fixed in Version 3 based on the vendor provided information. As we now know Version 3 has the same vulnerabilities as Version 2.
Yet two weeks later there has been no correction or updated Advisory. This is an issue that affects PLC’s and RTU’s from over 100 different vendors, and many of these vendors and their customers believe all is well since they are running on Version 3 of CoDeSys.
Reid showed the exploits on two Japanese products, one from Hitachi and the other from Sanyo-Denki. The later is used to control robot arms. There have been no Alerts or Advisories for these specific examples or the 100′s of affected products.
To be clear, I’m not saying ICS-CERT should jump every time a researcher demonstrates a vulnerability. The whole vulnerability in ICS is overplayed given that ICS-CERT does not consider insecure by design as a vulnerability.
They should have a clear and public set of procedures for vulnerability handling so the community can understand what they can expect and how they should interpret the Alerts and Advisories.