All your serial are belong to us!
Today’s press release from an unnamed company (to protect the innocent of course) has driven me to zombify the tired “all you base” internet meme. In our ever growing drive to trade security for ease of use and convenience you can purchase micro devices that plug into your RS-485 lines and on one end, encapsulate your previously somewhat protected serial comms into nice TCP/IP packets, and send them across your ethernet network to the other end where they are decapsulated and passed back serially to your field device. Sounds nice at first glance, allowing you to use existing twisted pair wiring, until you look at it with a security perspective.
These communications which were previously somewhat protected from the majority of IT based attack vectors are now exposed to the same packet tampering, replay and data spoofing attacks of any other TCP/IP communication. The protocols are not unknown, serial Modbus being an example where documentation is available and an educated attacker could now readily tamper with the data. From a hacker’s perspective, the more perviously tough to get at serial back plane communications now encapsulated in TCP/IP the better.
Upon reading the press release I dug up more info on the product hoping to find some assurance of packet hashing or encryption.
At S4, one of the break discussions I engaged in was how much would it cost manufacturers to upgrade CPUs in forthcoming devices to CPUs that would support full packet encryption, without adding latency into the communications pathway. The consensus was from a pure manufacturing stand point, less than $5.00 a device. While this doesn’t account for the additional R&D and testing such a product would require it does beg the question:
When will we stop trading ease of use and the saving of a few dollars in product development for actually producing products where security is one of the driving design principles?
Author: Kevin Lackey
Posted: February 4th, 2010 under Big Picture.
Comments: 4
Comments
Comment from Matthew Franz
Time: February 4, 2010, 10:09 pm
Adding these devices to existing networks is bad but at least you know it and are consciously doing it.
Worse is the case vendors include embedded device servers in Ethernet-enabled in product unbenknownst to the purchaser.
And of course the meter vendor probably only knows their legacy protocol that is being sent over Ethernet. And when you ask them what are all these other crazy services running and can they be disabled you get silence.
Some of the device servers do provide encryption but that requires the MDMS vendor to also add that to their device driver which is pretty unlikely for all of the reasons why crypto is hard in this space.
Comment from Erik H
Time: February 5, 2010, 3:51 am
The real problem in my opinion is that these RS485-Ethernet-conversion devices cause utility companies to use shared media (their Ethernet based constrol system network) rather than their otherwise dedicated RS-485 line. Doing so removes the air-gap security they once had.
Users of these devices could of course set up an isolated Ethernet network for each old RS-485 line, but I don’t think that will hapen in reality. Another option that springs to mind is of course to set up a properly encrypted VLAN on the control system network for each old RS-485 line. That way they would maintain separation (maybe not as well as with air-gapping) and there would be no real need for encryption support in the devices (even though I’m a sucker for end-to-end encryption).
Just some thoughs of mine…
Comment from darren mcintosh
Time: February 5, 2010, 3:56 am
comes back to procurement langauge doesn’t it?
Comment from amino world
Time: February 5, 2010, 5:30 pm
it could (and may already) be worse — it could be wireless. oh, wait…
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